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NOTES 
Claim Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal 
Notice Or Substantial Documentation? 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Tort Claims Act1 (FTCA) allows persons injured by 
negligent federal employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment to sue the federal government. 2 Before Congress amended the 
FTCA in 1966,3 an injured party seeking less than $2,500 in damages 
could either file a claim with the offending agency or sue the govern-
ment directly.4 A party seeking more than $2,500 had no choice but 
to file suit. 5 Congress amended the FTCA 6 in order to encourage 
claims settlement,7 to reduce court congestion, 8 and to minimize the 
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides that: 
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against 
the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
3. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966). 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. II 1965-66); cf. 
Schlingman v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 454, 455 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("The filing of an admin-
istrative claim is not a prerequisite to filing or maintaining an action in this court, especially 
when the demand is in excess of $2,500."). A claimant who chose to submit a claim to the 
federal agency could withdraw the claim and file suit ifhe gave fifteen days written notice and 
the agency had not yet made final disposition of the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1964), 
amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (Supp. II 1965-66). 
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. II 1965-66); Improve-
ment of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: Hearings on H.R 13650, 
13651, 13652, and 14182 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings) (statement of John W. Douglas, Assis-
tant Attorney General) ("[T]he present statutory scheme forces all tort claims over $2,500 to 
become tort suits .••. "); S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2516 [hereinafter cited as s. REP. No. 1327) ("For claims 
over ($2,500], the individual has no alternative but to file suit."). 
6. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2401, 2671, 2672, 2675, 2677, 2678, 2679, 31 U.S.C. § 724(a), and 38 U.S.C.§4116 (1976)). 
For additional discussion of the 1966 amendments, see Corboy, The Revised Federal Tori 
Claims Act: A Practitioner's View, 2 FORUM 67 (1967); Corboy, Shielding the Plainl{/J's Achilles' 
Heel· Tori Claim Notices lo Governmental Entities, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 609, 635-42 (1979); 
Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1212-22 
(1967); Pitard, Procedural Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims A cl, 21 LOY. L. REV. 899, 899-905 
(1975); Silverman, The Ins and Outs of Filing a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. 
AIR. L. CoM. 41 (1979); Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Administrative Claims, 20 
BAYLOR L. REV. 336 (1968); Comment,Adminislralive Claims and the Substitution of the United 
Stales as Defendant Under the Federal Drivers Act: The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act?, 29 EMORY L.J. 755, 764-68 (1980). 
1. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney Gen-
1641 
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cost of processing claims.9 Specifically, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. 
section 267210 to instruct the Attorney General to promulgate regu-
lations governing the handling and settlement of tort claims. 11 Con-
gress also changed section 2675(a)12 to state that "[a]n action shall 
not be instituted upon a claim against the Unite9- States . . . unless 
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate 
Federal agency .... "13 
This administrative claim requirement demands that an injured 
party properly present the claim within the FTCA's two-year limita-
tions period. 14 Failure to do so deprives federal courts of jurisdic-
tion over any subsequent suit based on the claim.15 Unfortunately, 
eral) ("The possibility of an early settlement without a lawsuit is advantageous ... ,") (em-
phasis added); S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNo. & Ao. 
NEWS at 2517 ("meritorious (claims] can be settled more quickly"); see notes 41-57 infra and 
accompanying text. 
8. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) ("[O]ne of the primary objectives [of this bill] is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the 
courts."); S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CON0, & AD. 
NEWS at 2518 ("Another objective of this bill is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the 
courts."). 
9. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) (plaintiff benefits because settlement entails no litigation expenses; government benefits 
because settlements are usually "less expensive than judgments"); S. REP. No. 1327,supra note 
5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & AD. NEWS at 2517 (minimizes need for "expen-
sive and time-consuming litigation"). 
10. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, sec. 1, 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966), 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976), provides in pertinent part that: 
The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations pre-
scribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, 
and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of 
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, 
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 
Congress also increased agency settlement authority from $2,500 to $25,000 ''to make the ad-
ministrative settlements a meaningful thing." S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted 
in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2518; see 28 u.s.c. § 2672 (1976). 
12. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, sec. 2, 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966). 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) states in full: 
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money 
damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim 
to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the 
agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to 
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of 
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this 
section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be as-
serted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, 
or counterclaim. 
14. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b) (1976) provides that: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in 
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or 
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or regis-
tered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented. 
15. E.g., Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir.) ("The right to sue the 
Government exists wholly by consent as expressed in § 2675, 28 U.S.C., which fixes the terms 
June 1983) Note - FTCA Claim Requirements 1643 
the interaction between private individuals and government claims 
officers complicates the claim requirement. 16 In an FTCA action, the 
claimant usually completes a Standard Form 9517 and sends it to the 
appropriate federal agency. After receiving the form, the claims of-
ficer will request documentation pursuant to the Department of Jus-
tice regulations. 18 If the injured party fails to provide all or part of 
and conditions on which suit may be instituted. The first requirement is the filing of a claim. 
That requirement is jurisdictional and is not waivable."), cert. den., 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Best 
Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Requirement for an ad• 
ministrative claim to be filed as a prerequisite under the Federal Tort Claims Act exemplifies 
one such condition; since the claim must precede the suit, the requirement is jurisdictional and 
cannot be waived."). 
Courts ordinarily dismiss without prejudice suits filed by persons who fail to comply with 
these jurisdictional prerequisites. However, if the court dismisses the suit after the FTCA's 
two-year statute of limitations has run, the claim is barred. Robinson v. United States Navy, 
342 F. Supp. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
16. For a variety of reasons, claimants often fail to respond to an agency's documentation 
requests. See,e.g., Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608,610 (9th Cir. 1982); Tuckerv. United 
States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 
447 (6th Cir. 1981); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 1981). 
17. See Appendix A. 
18. By authority granted under 28 U.S.C. §2672 (1976), the Attorney General promulgated 
regulations governing the processing of claims filed with federal agencies. See 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 14.1-14.11 (1982). 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2-14.4 are the only regulations relevant to this Note. 
They define "presenting a claim," explain who may file a claim, and detail claim documenta• 
tion requirements. These regulations are, in pertinent part: 
28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1982) Administrative claim; when presented. 
(a) For purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 240l(b) and 2672, a claim shall be 
deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly 
authorized agent or legal representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other written 
notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain 
for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by 
reason of the incident. 
28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1982) Administrative claim; who may file. 
(a) A claim for injury to or loss of property may be presented by the owner of the 
property, his duly authorized agent or legal representative. 
(b) A claim for personal injury may be presented by the injured person, his duly au-
thorized agent, or legal representative. 
(c) A claim based on death may be presented by the executor or administrator of the 
dccendent's tJ'ic I estate, or by any other person legally entitled to assert such a claim in 
accordance with applicable State law. 
(d) A claim for loss wholly compensated by an insurer with the rights of a subrogee 
may be presented by insurer. A claim for loss partially compensated by an insurer with 
the rights of a subrogee may be presented by the parties individually as their respective 
interests appear, or jointly. 
(e) A claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall be presented in the 
name of the claimant, be si~ed by the agent or legal representative, show the title or legal 
capacity of the person signmg, and be accompanied by evidence of his authority to pres-
ent a claim on behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, 
or other representative. 
28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1982) Administrative claims; evidence and information to be submitted. 
(a) Death. In support of a claim based on death, the claimant may be required to 
submit the following evidence or information: 
(1) An authenticated death ccrtificat~ or other competent evidence showing cause of 
death, date of death, and age of the decedent. 
(2) Decedent's employment or occupation at time of death, including his monthly or 
yearly salary or earnings (if any), and the duration of his last employment or occupation. 
(3) Full names, addresses, birth dates; kinship, and marital status of the decedent's 
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the requested information, the question arises whether he has prop-
survivors, including identification of those survivors who were dependent for support 
upon the decedent at the time of his death. 
(4) Degree of support afforded by the decedent to each survivor dependent upon him 
for support at the time of his death. 
(5) Decedent's general physical and mental condition before death. 
(6) Itemized bills for medical and burial expenses incurred by reason of the incident 
causing death, or itemized receipts of payment for such expenses. 
(7) If damages for pain and suffering prior to death are claimed, a physician's detailed 
statement specifying the injuries suffered, duration of pain and suffering, any dru~ ad-
ministered for pain, and the decedent's physical condition in the interval between mjury 
and death. 
(8) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the respon-
sibility of the United States for the death or damages claimed. 
(b) Personal injury. In support of a claim for personal injury, including pain and suf• 
fering, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information: 
(1) A written report by his attending physician or dentist setting forth the nature and 
extent of the injury, nature and extent of treatment, any degree of temP?rary or perma• 
nent disability, the prognosis, period of hospitalization, and any dimirushed earnmg ca• 
pacity. In addition, the claimant may be required to submit to a physical or mental 
examination by a physician employed by the agency or another Federal agency. A copy 
of the report of the examining physician shall be made available to the claimant upon the 
claimant's written request provided that he has, upon request, furnished the report re• 
ferred to in the first sentence of this paragraph and has made or agrees to make available 
to the agency any other physician's reports previously or thereafter made of the physical 
or mental condition which is the subject matter of his claim. 
(2) Itemized bills for medical, dental, and hospital expenses incurred, or itemized re• 
ceipts of payment for such expenses. 
(3) If the prognosis reveals the necessity for future treatment, a statement of expected 
expenses for such treatment. 
(4) If a claim is made for loss of time from employment, a written statement from his 
employer showing actual time lost from employment, whether he is a full or part-time 
employee, and wages or salary actually lost. 
(5) If a claim is made for loss of income and the claimant is self-employed, documen• 
tary evidence showing the amounts of earnings actually lost. 
(6) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the respon• 
sibility of the United States for the personal injury or the damages claimed. 
(c) Property damage. In support of a claim for injury to or loss of property, real or 
personal, the claimant may be required to submit the following evidence or information: 
(1) Proof of ownership. 
(2) A detailed statement of the amount claimed with respect to each item of property. 
(3) An itemized receipt of payment for necessary repairs or itemized written estunates 
of the cost of such repairs. 
(4) A statement listing date of purchase, purchase price and salvage value, where re• 
pair is not economical. 
(5) Any other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the respon• 
sibility of the United States for the injury to or loss of property or the damages claimed. 
The regulation's requirements for presenting a claim apply both to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), the 
statute of limitations provision, and to 28 U.S.C. § 2672, which authorizes promulgation of 
claim processing regulations. See notes 11 & 14 supra for the text of these sections, 
The Attorney General added the last sentence of §14.2(b)(l) to clarify that claims are 
"presented" only when received by the appropriate agency. See 46 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (1981), 
Individual agencies may promulgate their own FTCA regulations, but these must be consistent 
with Justice Department regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.11 (1982), 
''There has been disagreement in the federal courts whether these provisions establish the 
requirement for a proper presentation of a claim pursuant to section 2675 or whether they only 
outline procedures for settlement negotiations under section 2672." Note, Federal Tori Claims 
Act: Notice of Claim Reljtliremenl, 61 MINN. L. REV. 513, 520 (1982); see Avery v, United 
States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) (Justice Department regulations deal with an agency's 
settlement authority and do not interpret §2675(a)); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 
447-48 (6th Cir. 1981) (Justice Department regulations govern settlement proceedings, not fed• 
eral jurisdictional prerequisites). However, this Note argues that because Congress intended 
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erly "presented the claim" under section 2675 so as to toll the 
FTCA's statute of limitations. 
Courts addressing the issue disagree on the proper interpretation 
of the legislative history of the FTCA amendments.19 The First Cir-
cuit, in Sw!ft v. United States, 20 relied on Congress's intent to en-
courage presuit settlements in holding that claimants who fail to 
comply with documentation requests have not properly presented a 
claim.21 Thus, claims that are not adequately documented within 
the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations are forever barred. 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has since concluded in Adams v. 
United States22 that a claim for a sum certain23 need only provide 
the 1966 amendments to improve settlement of claims, see notes 41-57 infra, the Justice De-
partment settlement regulations necessarily infonn the definition of §2675's presentation 
requirement. 
19. Although "it is appropriate to begin with the language of the statute itself," Northwest 
Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981), courts must rely instead on the 
legislative history because the FfCA amendments do not themselves define "presented the 
claim." See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). Moreover, although "(a) fundamental canon of statu-
tory construction is that ... words (should) be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contempo-
rary, co=on meaning," Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979), no court has relied on 
the plain meaning of the "presented the claim" language. See, e.g., Avery v. United States, 
680 F.2d 608,610 (9th Cir. 1982) ("the statute on its face does not provide a clear answer to the 
problem before us"). 
When the words of a statute are ambiguous, as they are here, the courts should use the 
legislative history to ascertain what Congress intended. United States v. Public Utils. 
Commn., 345 U.S. 295,315 (1953). Even if the words of the statute did have a plain meaning, 
that meaning might still yield ''to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent." Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979); accord, United Steelworkers 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). Similarly, other authorities indicate that courts should not 
rely too heavily on the plain meaning rule. See, e.g., Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,425 (1918) 
("A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may 
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used."); Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) ("it is one of the surest indexes of a 
mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary"), qffd , 326 
U.S. 404 (1945); Murphy, Old Maxims Never JJie: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory 
Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1317 (1975) ("[Statu-
tory construction] questions cannot be answered by the simple-minded formulae often ad-
vanced, including the plain meaning rule."). 
20. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs husband died of a heart attack shortly after 
having an automobile accident with a Forest Service employee. Counsel submitted plaintiffs 
two million dollar claim for personal injury, loss of consortium, and wrongful death, but ig-
nored the agency's repeated documentation requests. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's holding that the plaintiffs claim should be dismissed as premature. 
21. 614 F.2d at 814 (" 'The purpose of requiring preliminary administrative presentation of 
a claim is to permit a government agency to evaluate and settle the claim at an early stage 
.... ' ") (quoting Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)). The 
First Circuit also upheld the district court's conclusion that an agency can demand supporting 
information pursuant to Justice Department regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2(a) and 14.4. 614 
F.2d at 814. For a discussion of the problems that this approach creates, see notes 58-71 infra 
and accompanying text. 
22. 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed suit against the Air 
Force, alleging that Air Force physicians negligently delivered their child. The child suffered 
severe brain damage during birth, allegedly due to an oxygen deficiency. Plaintiffs submitted a 
completed Standard Form 95, see Appendix A, and claimed a sum certain. However, they did 
not submit requested supporting documentation and failed to include information regarding 
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the affected agency with notice24 and that a second policy of the 1966 
amendments - promoting fair treatment of claimants - prevents 
federal agencies from requiring claim documentation.25 Accordingly, 
the Fifth Circuit held that undocumented claims that provide the 
agency with notice sufficient to permit investigation satisfy section 
2675's presentation requirement and preserve the injured party's 
ability to sue.26 Three other circuits have since adopted the Adams 
interpretation of the amendment's legislative history.27 
This Note finds both the Adams and Sw!ft positions unsatisfac-
tory. Part I contends thatAdams misconstrued the legislative history 
of the FTCA amendments by applying a mioim::tl notice standard 
future expenses. The parties disputed whether the Air Force possessed or had access to the 
information demanded. The district court deemed this question irrelevant and ruled that the 
claimants, to perfect their claim, should have informed the Air Force that they had not in-
curred any unreported medical expenses and should also have provided an estimate of future 
medical expenses. It then held that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the administrative claim require-
ment and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. See 615 F.2d at 285-86. The Fifth 
Circuit reversed, stating that an injured party meets the claim requirement of§ 2675 if he or 
she "(I) gives the agency written notice of [the] claim sufficient to enable the agency to investi-
gate and (2) places a value on [the] claim." 615 F.2d at 289. The court did not base its holding 
on the assumption that the Air Force already had the information. 
23. The Adams court required a claimant to "place( ] a value on his or her claim." 615 
F.2d at 289. This precondition derives from section 2675(b), which states that "(a]ction under 
this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented 
to the federal agency .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976). Courts have universally recognized 
this sum certain requirement. See, e.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 272 (7th Cir. 
1981) (per curiam) ("It is well settled that a Standard Form 95 filed with the 'amount of claim' 
omitted is invalid. Likewise, a separate claim notice submitted without a specific dollar 
amount is ineffective."); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971) (dismissing 
suit because, among other things, plaintiff had not claimed sum certain damages). 
Most of the litigation regarding the sum certain requirement involves claims that contain 
qualified amounts. See, e.g., Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268,273 (7th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam) (personal injury claim for "149.42 presently" states a sum certain); Fallon v. United 
States, 405 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 1976) (personal injury claim for "approximately 
$15,000.00" states a sum certain); cf. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(personal injury claim for an amount "unknown at this time" does not state a sum certain and 
thus failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 2675). 
24. 615 F.2d at 288-89. 
25. 615 F.2d at 288, 291. 
26. 615 F.2d at 289. 
21. See Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United States 
Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 
I 98 I). Although none of the plaintiffs in these cases contended that the agency already pos-
sessed the requested information, the court in each instance applied the Adams standard. See 
note 22supra. At least one district court in the Eighth Circuit has accepted the Adams docu-
mentation standard. See Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1981). 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided a case directly on point. It has, 
however, strongly suggested that it will follow Adams when given the opportunity. See Erx-
leben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268, 271 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Notwithstanding 
Erxleben's implication, at least one district court in the Seventh Circuit has since declined to 
follow Adams. See Howard v. United States, No. 81 C 3856 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1982) (available 
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). One district court in the Second Circuit has also refused 
to apply the Adams standard. Pollitt v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 3883 (HFW) (S,D.N.Y. 
Feb. 13, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). 
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and then argues that Swfft contravenes the amendments' fairness 
policy by permitting ambiguous, overreaching documentation re-
quests. Part II contends that courts should interpret section 2675's 
"presented the claim" language as an accommodation between two 
competing Congressional objectives: presuit claims settlement and 
fair treatment of claimants. The Note proposes that until the De-
partment of Justice modifies its current claims regulations,28 courts 
should toll the statute of limitations whenever an individual's claim 
includes the information requested on Standard Form 95. However, 
the statute of limitations should begin to run again if the claimant 
fails to comply with unambiguous documentation requests that de-
mand information ordinarily discoverable tinder the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
I. CURRENT APPROACHES: MINIMAL NOTICE AND 
DOCUMENTATION 
Both Adams and Swfft relied on the legislative history of the 
FTCA amendments to support their respective interpretations of the 
administrative claim requirement. Neither interpretation is correct 
because both promote only one of the goals of the amendments, in-
stead of encouraging both presuit settlement and fair treatment of 
claimants. 
A. Minimal Notice: Misconstruing Legislative Intent 
Adams and other courts29 adopting a minimal notice standard 
base their position on two aspects of the legislative history. First, 
according to these courts, the Senate Report accompanying the 1966 
amendments30 indicates that Congress patterned the claim require-
ment after state and municipal statutes, which require only minimal 
notice.31 Second, these courts reason that a minimal notice standard 
furthers the amendments' policy of promoting fair treatment of 
claimants without impeding Congress's intent to promote presuit set-
tlement of claims.32 Neither argument is persuasive. 
28. See note 18 supra; cf. note 98 i,ifra. 
29. See note 27 supra. 
30. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515. 
The House Report on the FfCA amendments bill, H.R. Rep. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1966), contains wording almost identical to the Senate Report. For this reason, and because 
the courts refer only to the Senate Report, this Note will cite the Senate Report as authority for 
the legislative history of the FfCA amendments. 
31. See Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United 
States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. I982);Adams, 615 F.2d at 289. 
32. Avery, 680 F.2d at 611; Tucker, 616 F.2d at 958;Adams, 615 F.2d at 289. 
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I. State and Municipal Statutes 
Senate Report No. 1327 establishes that Congress intended to 
emulate state and municipal statutes when it enacted the 1966 
amendments;33 however, the inference supported by Congress's reli-
ance on these statutes is not clear. The Adams court observed that 
the municipal statutes cited by the Senate Report often require only 
"notice of an accident within a fixed time,"34 and reasoned that Con-
gress intended that similar minimal notice would satisfy section 
2675's administrative claim requirement.35 However, a critical exam-
ination of the entire legislative history reveals that Congress never 
intended that its reference to municipal statutes would govern the 
definition of "presented the claim." Instead, the Senate Report cited 
those statutes simply as precedent for the administrative claim re-
quirement itself. 
Two arguments support this interpretation. The first turns on the 
Senate Report's presentation of the state statutes. The Report states 
at the outset of its discussion of these statutes that "[t]he requirement 
of an administrative claim as a prerequisite to suit has numerous 
33. The relevant Senate Report passage states that: 
The requirement of an administrative claims as prerequisite to suit has numerous 
precedents in statutes governing tort claims against municipalities. These laws often pro-
vide that a municipality must be given notice of an accident within a fixed time. The 
purpose of this notice has been summarized as being-
"* * * to protect the municipality from the expense of needless litigation, give it an 
opportunity for investigation, and allow it to adjust differences and settle claims without 
suit (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), section 53.153)." 
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 1-923 of the District of Columbia 
Code includes the following language concerning suits for damages caused by employees 
driving vehicles-
" * * * No suit shall be instituted * * * unless the claimant shall have first given notice 
to the District and shall have presented to the District in writing a claim for money dam-
ages in connection therewith, and the District has had 6 months from the date of such 
filing within which to make final disposition of such claim * * * ." 
Another example of a precedent in State practice is to be found in the laws of the State 
of Iowa (Laws of the 61st General Assembly, ch. 79 (Mar. 26, 1965)) which provide re-
quirements very similar to those provided in H.R. 13650. This statute provides for tort 
claims against the State oflowa and requires that a claim must first be presented to a State 
appeal board and further includes language providing that no suit is permitted unless the 
appeal board has made final disposition of the claim. 
s. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
2517-18; cf. Hearings, supra note 5, at 19 ("A number of States and municipalities which per-
mit suits ... require the filing of claims ... in advance of the lawsuit. That is true in the 
District of Columbia."). 
34. 615 F.2d at 289 (quoting S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2517). 
35. The court stated that "Congress deemed this minimal notice sufficient to inform the 
relevant agency of the existence of a claim .••• This requisite minimal notice ••. promptly 
informs the relevant agency of the circumstances of the accident so that it may investigate the 
claim and respond either by settlement or by defense." 615 F.2d at 289. The court could have 
reinforced this point by citing the House Hearings' only reference to notice. See Hearings, 
supra note 5, at 20. 
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precedents in statutes governing tort claims against municipalities."36 
The Senate Report's subsequent discussion of notice37 must be read 
in the context of this introductory statement, which indicates that the 
state statutes were cited as support for, and not as a description of, 
the proposed federal administrative claim requirement. 
Second, the Report's approving reference to the District of Co-
lumbia and Iowa statutes38 supports the conclusion that Congress 
cited those statutes merely as precedent for an administrative claim 
requirement. Neither statute imposes the same requirements as the 
FTCA,39 a fact that the Senate Report partially acknowledged.40 
This inconsistency between the Senate Report's mention of notice 
and its citation of the two state statutes suggests that Congress never 
considered the state statutes' definition of a claim requirement, but 
rather intended to justify through precedent what was then a novel 
federal administrative claim requirement. 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Senate Report No. 1327 indicates that the main purpose of the 
1966 amendments was to encourage presuit settlements41 in order to 
reduce litigation expenses42 and court congestion.43 Instead of con-
struing the claim requirement in light of this objective, Adams relied 
36. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517 (emphasis added). 
37. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517-18; see note 33 supra. 
38. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517-18; see note 33 supra. ' 
39. The D.C. Code requires claimants to provide notice to the District of Columbia in 
accordance with § 12-309 and to present a claim for money damages. D.C. CooE ANN. § 1-
1213 (1981). The Code defines notice in§ 12-309 as "the approximate time, place, cause, and 
circumstances of the injury or damage." D.C. CooE ANN. § 12-309 (1981). The FrCA's claim 
requirement differs from the D.C. Code's because neither section 2675(a) nor section 240l{b) 
defines "presented the claim." See notes 13-14supra. 
The Iowa statute also differs from the FfCA. Although neither statute explains what a 
claimant must do to present a claim, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675(a), 240l{b); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 25.1 (West 1978), Iowa requires a claimant to file his claim with the state appeal board, IOWA 
CODE ANN.-§ 25A.13, whereas the United States requires the claimant to file with the appro-
priate federal agency, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). 
40. s. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517-18 ("[T]he State oflowa ... provide[s] requirements very similar to those provided in 
H.R. 13650."). 
41. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517 (the amendments increase the chance of "possible settlement before a court action" 
because the agency will have the "best information concerning the activity which gave rise to 
the claim"); see also Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant 
Attorney General) ("The possibility of an early settlement" is increased.); 112 CONG. REc. 
12,259 (1966) (statement of Representative Ashmore) (''The object, really, is to settle claims 
• . . fairly expeditiously and prevent unnecessary lawsuits."). 
42. S. REP. No. 1327,supra note 5, at 3,reprintedin 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517 (the amendments encourage the parties to settle cases and thus eliminate "the need for 
filing suit and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation"); see also 112 CONG. REc. 
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on the 1966 amendments' prefatory language, which states that the 
FTCA amendments and three companion bills,44 "have the common 
purpose of providing for more fair and equitable treatment of pri-
vate individuals and claimants when they deal with the Government 
or are involved in litigation with their Government."45 The Adams 
court concluded that the goal of fairness would be frustrated if a 
claimant were required to provide more information than was neces-
sary to enable the agency to investigate the claim.46 
The Adams court's reliance on the goal of fairness suffers from 
two flaws. First, the court used the fairness policy to make compli-
ance with government documentation requests voluntary,47 thus un-
dermining the amendments' goal of providing the government with 
information that could facilitate presuit settlement.48 The govern-
14,376 (1966) (statement of Senator Ervin) ("[M]eritorious claims would be settled more quick-
ly, without the need for expensive and time-consuming litigation .... "). 
43. S. REP. No. 1321,supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2518 ("Another objective of this bill is to reduce unnecessary congestion in the courts."). 
Before the 1966 amendments, the Attorney General could not settle claims without court 
approval. The 1966 amendments abolished this requirement. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and 
Government Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1219-20 (1967). 
44. The three other bills sought to benefit private citizens vis-a-vis the government. The 
first provided agencies with additional authority to compromise Government claims against 
private individuals and to terminate or suspend collection efforts when the debtor-citizen lacks 
all present or prospective ability to pay. See H.R. REP. No. 1533, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
The second imposed statutes of limitations for contract and tort actions initiated by the gov-
ernment against private individuals. See H.R. REP. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
The third allowed private individuals winning civil suits against the Government to collect 
costs as part of awarded judgments. See H.R. REP. No. 1535, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The 
three bills, all of which had been requested by the Justice Department, were eventually en-
acted by Congress. See Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304 (1966); Act of 
July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (1966); Act of July 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-508, 
80 Stat. 308 (1966). 
45. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2515-16. 
46. 615 F.2d at 289, 291-92. 
47. 615 F.2d at 290 ("A claimant will ordinarily comply with 28 C.F.R. §§14.1-14.11 ifhe 
or she wishes to settle his or her claim with the appropriate agency.") (emphasis added). 
48. Many courts that have construed § 2675(a) to require documentation have recognized 
the importance of supporting documentation to the presuit settlement process. See, e.g., Swift 
v. United States, 614 F.2d at 814 ("(C]ounsel's failure to document the personal injury part of 
the administrative claim precluded the agency from evaluating the entire claim for settlement 
purposes."); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981) (avail-
able on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("[T]he Government, at a minimum, is entitled to 
sufficient information to enable it to evaluate the claim and choose between settlement and 
litigation."); Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("their failure to 
furnish information on damages absolutely foreclosed the government from arriving at a rea• 
sonable settlement figure"). 
Both plaintiffs and defendant's lawyers agree that responsible claim evaluation requires 
more information than the Adams minimal notice standard can produce. See, e.g., P. HER• 
MANN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS/ THROUGH LEVERAGE 170 (1965) (a wise lawyer for the plain-
tiff will itemize all medical bills having to do with a particular accidental injury, will furnish 
copies of the bills to an insurance adjuster or defense counsel, and will attempt to secure an 
employer's statement of time and wages lost); Faust, What Insurance Companies Want from 
Claimant's Counsel lo Expedite Settlements, in NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL IN-
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ment needs information soon after it receives notice of the claim in 
order to expedite settlement negotiations. In fact, the current regula-
tions primarily request information that either determines whether 
the claimant is the proper party to bring the claim or enables the 
agency to assess the accuracy of the alleged damages.49 Disclosure 
of this information is essential to the policy of facilitating presuit 
settlements. 
Adams argued that a minimal notice requirement adequately en-
courages settlements because an agency can obtain through investi-
gation the information needed to settle a case.50 This point is 
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, agencies lack the resources51 to 
obtain information that the claimant can provide with little incon-
venience.52 Second, most information requested under the current 
regulations can be acquired through discovery after a suit is filed.53 
If the government requests information during discovery, the claim-
JURY ACTIONS 4, 5 (1956). (To judge the settlement value of the case, the insurance company 
needs a doctor's certificate explaining plaintiff's injury, the name of the plaintiff's employer, 
the type of work the plaintiff does and his wages, and a statement of the period of disability 
claimed.); Frost, Compromising Cases Which Have Selllement Values of $500 to $1,500, in NE-
GOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS 14, 15 (1956) (claimant's attorney 
must provide the insurance company with "medical reports and itemized lists of special dam-
ages" if he wants to settle the claim); Lynch, Selllement of Civil Cases: A View from the Bench, 
LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 8, 9 (settlement information required by insurance companies in-
cludes medical reports, verification of wages and copies of medical bills); Wormwood, Evalua-
tion and Settlement of Claims, 38 Wis. B. BULL., Oct. 1965, at 7, 8-10. (Some of the more 
important factors considered by the defense attorney before settlement discussions include: 
medical and hospital expenses to date, future medical and hospital expenses, loss of earnings, 
and, in death cases, dependency.). 
49. See note 18 supra. 
50. 615 F.2d at 289 ("minimal notice ... promptly informs the relevant agency ... so 
that it may investigate the claim"). 
51. The sheer volume of claims renders effective independent investigation difficult. See 
Volk, Processing and Negotiating the Military Medical Malpractice Claim, TRIAL, June 1982, at 
51, 52 ("Unfortunately, the agency will do very little on your [medical malpractice] claim for 
almost the entire six months. There simply are so many claims that until the six-month dead-
line begins to expire, the claim will not be worked."). 
Of course, the fact that very little can be done on a medical malpractice claim does not 
mean that an agency cannot process simpler claims more quickly. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra 
note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2518-19 ("It is obvious that 
there will be some difficult tort claims that cannot be processed and evaluated in [the] 6 month 
period. The great bulk of them, however, should be ready for decision within this period."). 
Cf. notes 54 & 56 infra and accompanying text. 
52. See Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("Such informa-
tion was within the sole control of plaintiffs, and by withholding it they automatically frus-
trated the purpose of Congress in requiring an administrative claims procedure in the first 
place."). 
53. In general, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... " FED. R. C1v. P. 
26(b)(l). This provision has been liberally construed. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
153, 177 (1979) (''The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-discovery rules 
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately inform-
ing the litigants in civil trials."); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297 (1969) ("[Rule 26(b)] has 
been generously construed to provide a great deal of latitude for discovery."); Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,507 (1947) ("We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are 
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ant or his attorney will be forced to provide the information anyway. 
Thus, the question in most cases is not whether the claimant must 
provide documentation but when. The policy of increasing presuit 
settlements, coupled with the fact that any information withheld can 
eventually be procured through discovery, indicates that the claim-
ant should provide requested information along with the claim. 
A second, more fundamental objection to theAdams court's reli-
ance on the fairness policy is that Congress did not intend fairness to 
mean that claimants need not document their claims. A careful read-
ing of the Senate Report reveals that Congress considered the 
amendments to be "fair and equitable" because the settlement pro-
cess would reduce the time and expense imposed on private individ-
uals bringing suits against the govemment.54 The Senate Report and 
the Hearings state that agencies should be able to handle the claims 
of private individuals quickly, particularly if the claims are simple.55 
In fact, the Department of Justice, the agency that requested the bill, 
believed that simpler claims could be handled without the aid of 
counsel.56 Even an individual who hires an attorney benefits by set-
tling with the agency within six months of filing a claim because the 
statutory limit on attorneys' fees is lower during that period than it is 
afterward.57 The fact that Congress made presuit settlement an at-
tractive alternative demonstrates that it intended to promote "fair 
and equitable treatment . . . of claimants" by reducing the time and 
expense of litigation. Adams incorrectly relied on the fairness policy 
to support a minimal notice requirement that might undermine the 
goal of expeditious settlement. The better interpretation of the legis-
lative history is that the settlement policy embodied in the FTCA 
amendments demands compliance with reasonable agency docu-
mentation requests, an issue to which this Note now turns. 
to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment."); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC· 
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2007 (1970). 
54. Congress recognized, however, that some complex suits might not be settled. See S. 
REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2S 18 
("[S]ome difficult tort claims cannot be processed and evaluated in this 6-month period."). 
The inferences supported by recognition of this fact are discussed at note 6S infra and accom-
panying text. 
55. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
at 2517. ("[M]eritorious [claims] can be settled more quickly without the need for filing suit 
and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation."); Hearings, supra note S, at 15 ("[A 
claimant] could [settle) without the bother and cost of litigation."). Congress also knew that 
presuit settlement would save the government money. Hearings, supra note 5, at 13 (statement 
of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) (settlements are "less expensive than judg• 
ments"); S. REP. No. 1327,supra note 5, at4,reprintedin 1966 U.S. CooE CONO. &Ao. NEWS 
at 2518 (settlement would save the Government "unnecessary" litigation expenses). 
56. Hearings,supra note 5, at 13 (Statement of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) (the "claimant . . . may not need to engage a lawyer''). 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1976) (twenty percent limit for settlements during administrative 
proceedings, twenty-five percent limit in all other situations). 
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B. Documenting Claims: Potential for Overreaching 
In Swffe v. United States, 58 plaintiffs ignored the government's 
repeated request to " 'provide [the agency] with the necessary evi-
dence needed in support of a claim for personal injury and death as 
specified on the [standard claim] form.' "59 The district court, recog-
nizing that federal regulations60 grant agencies the authority to re-
quest such information, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction.61 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that allowing 
the plaintiff to file suit without first documenting the claim with the 
appropriate agency would frustrate the FTCA amendments' policy 
of increasing presuit settlements. 62 
Although Swffe properly requires documentation to encourage 
presuit settlements, the opinion is unsatisfactory because it upholds 
the Department of Justice regulations in their entirety63 without de-
termining whether they violate the fairness policy of the FTCA 
amendments.64 Congress intended the amendments to provide more 
equitable treatment of claimants by reducing the time and expense 
of filing claims against the government.65 It did not, however, intend 
the administrative claim procedure to prejudice a claimant's ability 
to litigate if settlement negotiations proved fruitless.66 
58. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980). 
59. 614 F.2d at 813. 
60. See note 18 supra. 
61. See 614 F.2d at 814. 
62. 614 F.2d at 814; see note 21 supra. 
63. See 614 F.2d at 814-15. 
64. See notes 25 & 45-46supra and accompanying text (discussing fairness policy ofFTCA 
amendments). 
65. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text. 
66. Congress did not expressly consider the limits that should be imposed on an agency's 
authority to request documentation. Instead, it indicated that the amendments would promote 
fair treatment of claimants by expediting the process of filing claims against the government. 
See notes 45-46 & 54-57 supra and accompanying text. Congress's silence concerning the 
permissible extent of documentation requests necessitates an inquiry into how Congress would 
have limited documentation had it considered the issue. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND 
SOURCES OF TIIE LAW 165 (1909). 
Several factors indicate that Congress would have prevented documentation requests from 
prejudicing a claimant's ability to seek recourse in the courts. First, statements in the legisla-
tive history support this conclusion. Congress anticipated that many claims would not be set-
tled. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
at 2518-19. Moreover, Congress wanted claimants to have the option of filing suit. See id. at 
6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2520. Because Congress knew that 
administrative proceedings would not resolve all disputes, it would not have sanctioned a doc-
umentation requirement that might prejudice claimant's case or prevent him from suing alto-
gether. 
Second, an analysis of the FTCA's original purpose lends further support to this conclu-
sion. Congress enacted the FTCA in part to extend "to injured parties . . . recovery as a 
matter of right." S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946); see also Note, The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE LJ. 534, 534-35 (1947) (discussing reasons for enacting the FTCA). 
In amending the FTCA to establish an administrative claim requirement, Congress never ex-
pressed an intention to prejudice the right to trial it had previously created. Therefore, Con-
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Current Justice Department regulations prejudice claimants in 
three ways. First, they fail to advise the claimant about the informa-
tion that an agency is authorized to demand.67 Second, the regula-
tions are inconsistent with Standard Form 95,68 the instrument by 
which claims are filed. Third, the Justice Department regulations 
permit an agency to demand information that it could not obtain if 
the parties were conducting discovery.69 This potential for over-
gress would not approve of documentation requirements that would impair a claiinant's right 
to litigate. 
67. The regulations are ambiguous in two respects. First, they state that an agency may 
require a claiinant to provide "(a]ny other evidence or information which may have a bearing 
on either the responsibility of the United States ... or the damages claiined." 28 C.F.R. 
§ 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(5) (1982); see note 18 supra. The breadth of this language arguably 
sanctions requests that demand information only tangentially related to the claiin. To date, 
however, no case has arisen where a clai.JJlant has challenged a particular request because of its 
ambiguity, and Sw!ft does not indicate whether a clai.JJlant would prevail if such challenge 
were made. 
Second, the regulations imply that compliance with a documentation request is optional 
because they state that "the claiinant may he required to submit the following evidence or 
information .... " 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a), (b), (c) (1982) (emphasis added). The courts have 
divided on the phrase's proper interpretation. Compare Tucker v. United States Postal Serv., 
676 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1982) (''That the information designated in 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 is 
intended for (settlement] purpose[s], and not as a prerequisite to the satisfaction of the timely 
filing requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b), is confirmed by the permissive language 'may be 
required to submit.'") (emphasis in original) with Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 
1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Unfortunately, plaintiffs put the emphasis on the wrong word. The 
regulation provides that such information 'may be required.'") (emphasis in original). Thus, 
the regulations do not clearly apprise claiinants of the information an agency may permissibly 
require. As a consequence, clai.JJlants may view agency documentation requests with a suspi• 
cion that will undermine the mutual trust needed to settle prior to suit. q: H. BAER & A. 
BRODER, How TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES FOR SETTLEMENT 91 (1973); P. HER• 
MANN, supra note 48, at 160. The Justice Department could eliminate this problem by stating 
specific documentation requirements in its regulations and in Standard Form 95. See Appen-
dix A; note 98 infra. 
68. Standard Form 95 warns that "[f]ailure to completely execute this form or to supply 
the requested information within two years from the date the allegations accrued may render 
your clai.JJl 'invalid.'" Standard Form 95, Back (Rev. 6-78); see Appendix A. Standard Form 
95 is thus consistent with Sw!ft in that it demands compliance with agency documentation 
requests. In contrast, the Justice Department regulations require that a claimant must execute 
"Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident," 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1982) 
(emphasis added), thus implying that Adams-type minimal notice will suffice. The phrase 
"other written notification" has generated considerable confusion. Compare Odin v. United 
States, 656 F.2d 798, 803 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (deferring ''to the Justice Department's inter-
pretation of its own regulations," court stated that a defective Standard Form 95, when com-
bined with information in letters from plaintiff, her attorney, and her physician, constituted 
"other written notification") and Dillon v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 862, 863 (D.S.D. 1979) 
(the court relied on this phrase to justify plaintifi's failure to include in her administrative 
clai.JJl the allegation that an operation was performed without informed consent) with Mudlo v. 
United States, 423 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("if one wants to make a claiin not on 
the usual form, then the claiinant had better make sure that the claiin provides the necessary 
information to indicate the basis for the demand"). 
69. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(5) (1982). ("claiinant may be required to submit 
... [a]ny other evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the responsibility 
of the United States ... or the damages clai.JJled"); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(b)(l) (1982) 
(requiring physical or mental examination, if so requested); note 18 supra. 
Congress probably envisioned that documentation requirements would be consistent with 
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Senate Report observed 
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reaching could jeopardize the private individual's ability to file suit 
on a claim.70 by allowing the government to circumvent the carefully 
that "80 percent [of tort cases] are settled prior to trial," S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, 
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2517, and expressed no intention to alter 
this result by expanding discovery authority under the administrative claim requirement. Cf. 
Jacoby, supra note 43, at 1215 ("Formerly, when suit was necessary ... the broad discovery 
procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . were frequently employed . . . ."). 
Congress probably designed the amendments to improve the timing of, and not the number of, 
settlements. Thus, the legislative history does not express a congressional intent to expand the 
scope of discovery in administrative claim proceedings. 
70. By allowing an agency to request "[a]ny other evidence or information which may 
have a bearing on either the responsibility of the United States ... or the damages claimed," 
28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6), (c)(S) (1982) (emphasis added), the Justice Department regula-
tions permit the government to demand information that is subject to an absolute or qualified 
privilege. In contrast, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) protects attorney work product. To discover 
documents and other tangibles in anticipation of litigation, the party seeking discovery must 
show that he has a "substantial need" for the material, and that he cannot, without undue 
hardship, obtain a substantial equivalent by other means. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 
326, 334 (8th Cir. 1977); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, at§ 2025. Work product 
that includes conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation receives even 
greater protection. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981) ("[f]orcing 
an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is particularly disfa-
vored because it tends to reveal the attorney's mental processes"); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 
1079 (4th Cir. 1981) (''while the protection of opinion work product is not absolute, only ex-
traordinary circumstances requiring disclosure permit piercing the work product doctrine"), 
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct 1632 (1982); Walker v. United Parcel Servs., 87 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980). 
Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B) provides qualified protection to facts known and 
opinions held by experts not expected to testify. A party may discover such information only 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Hoover v. United States, 611 F.2d 
1132, 1142 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980) (party seeking such disclosure carries a heavy burden); United 
States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 372-73 (E.D. Mich. 1971); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, supra note 53, at § 2033; see generally Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating lo Discovery of Experts and Attorney's 
Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. I 145 (1971). 
While not specifically protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a third category 
of information universally recognized as nondiscoverable consists of the confidential commu-
nications between attorney and client 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 53, at§ 2017; 
see, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 1978) ("long established 
rule that confidential communications between an attorney and his client are absolutely privi-
leged from disclosure against the will of the client"); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545,548 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (l>er curiam) ("It is a fundamental "tenet of the law of evidence that, generally, 
communications between attorney and client are privileged and not subject to compelled dis-
closure."). 
Obviously, agencies should at no time be allowed to request information that is subject to 
an absolute privilege. On the other hand, information subject to qualified privilege may be 
crucial to settlement prospects. However, an unqualified right to obtain this information cir-
cumvents the careful balance of interests expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A hearing to determine if an agency actually had a "substantial need" to obtain certain 
information might preserve the balance of procedural interests, but would increase ancillary 
judicial proceedings required to determine whether requested information fell within a partic-
ular rule of privilege, as well as whether the request itself satisfied the "substantial need" 
requirement Ancillary proceedings might also create an atmosphere hostile to settlement pros-
pects. 
The proposal advanced in this Note requires that courts preclude ancillary procedures hav-
ing to do with an agency's "substantial need" until the claimant files suit. This approach has 
two advantages. First, it limits presuit proceedings to issues going to whether the requested 
information is privileged. Second, and more important, such a rule balances discovery powers 
between claimants and agencies. Because claimants cannot use the Freedom of Information 
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tailored balance of competing interests contained in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the regulations violate the fairness 
,Policy by impairing a claimant's ability to litigate his claim if negoti-
ations prove unsuccessful. 
While Sw!ft correctly promotes the settlement policy of the 
FTCA amendments, it fails to accommodate the FTCA's other pol-
icy objective - fair treatment of claimants - by upholding the De-
partment of Justice regulations.71 Because neither Sw!ft nor Adams 
accommodates the competing interests of the FTCA amendments, 
the next section of this Note proposes a proper balance. 
Ill. BALANCING THE COMPETING POLICIES OF THE 1966 
.AMENDMENTS 
Documentation of claims facilitates settlements. The sooner an 
agency receives the presuit information necessary to evaluate a 
claim, the sooner serious settlement negotiations can take place. 72 
Moreover, a documentation requirement discourages claimants from 
submitting inflated claims, which only hamper settlement pros-
pects. 73 Finally, many documentation requests are patently reason-
able because they enable the agency to obtain information that the 
claimant either already possesses or can easily acquire.74 
However, an agency should not use documentation requests as a 
subterfuge to dismiss otherwise valid claims. The requests should 
not prejudice a subsequent suit should settlement negotiations prove 
fruitless.75 Moreover, the agency should request specific information 
because ambiguous requests prevent even diligent claimants from 
knowing whether they have provided all the requested 
information.76 
To balance the competing fairness and settlement policies of the 
FTCA amendments, courts should hold that the statute of limita-
tions tolls when the claimant files a Standard Form 95 or provides 
Act to obtain privileged information even if they can show a "substantial need" for it, the 
government should not be allowed to secure similarly privileged information through docu-
mentation requests. To do otherwise would be to give one potential litigant an unfair settle-
ment advantage. See notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See Note, supra note 18, at 521. 
12. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
13. See H. BAER & A. BRODER, supra note 67, at 81 ("Defendant's representative is not 
predisposed to negotiate against a ridiculously high demand."); H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, THE 
LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR 224 (1977) ("(A] defense attorney should never make a settlement 
unless the investigation file contains sufficient information to support the amount which is 
being paid."); P. HERMANN, supra note 48, at 41 ("Nothing gets negotiation off to a poorer 
start than a ridiculous demand or offer . . . ."). 
14. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. 
15. See notes 66 & 70 supra and accompanying text. 
16. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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equivalent information within the two year limitation period.77 
However, if a claimant subsequently fails to comply within a reason-
able time with an agency's unambiguous78 requests for information 
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,79 the stat-
ute of limitations should begin to run again. Information provided 
within a reasonable time should relate back to the initial filing. 80 
This proposal properly accommodates the two competing poli-
cies of the 1966 FTCA amendments. Requiring claimants to comply 
with documentation requests enables the agency to obtain the infor-
mation it needs to evaluate claims and begin settlement negotia-
tions. 81 Demanding that agencies make specific requests minimizes 
the possibility that claimants will be unable to determine whether 
they have complied.82 Finally, limiting requests to those that satisfy 
the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure en-
sures that claimants will not be prejudiced should they choose to 
77. This standard is consistent with theAdams minimal notice requirement. See notes 24-
27 & 30-32 supra and accompanying text; cf. Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137, 139 
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (allowing a timely claim that failed to meet sum certain requirement to be 
amended after the statute of limitations had run); Note, supra note 18, at 531-34 (proposing a 
factor test to determine what information is required to notify an agency of a claim). 
78. To comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an agency's documentation re-
quest should be specific. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33 (interrogatories); Jewish Hosp. Assn. v. Struck 
Constr. Co., 77 F.R.D. 59, 60 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (plaintiff not required to answer interrogatory 
question that is ambiguous and calls for a legal conclusion); Struthers Scientific & Intl. Corp. 
v. General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (''Though technical precision in 
the phrasing of interrogatories is not demanded, something more is required than the vague 
phraseology used here.") (footnote omitted); Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.RD. 225, 227 
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (interrogatory "calling for a recitation of all information the defendant pos-
sesses 'relating to the accident' is entirely too broad to permit an effective response"); Stovall v. 
Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 30 F.R.D. 152, 154 (S.D. Tex. 1961) ("Any interrogatory which is too 
general and all-inclusive need not be answered."). 
79. FED. R. Crv. P. 26, 34-36 properly limit the agency's authority to request supporting 
documentation. These rules allow discovery of the types of information already listed in 28 
C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.11 (1982) and the type of documentation available to claimants through the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See notes 86-88 i'!fra and accompanying text. The 
other discovery rules involve depositions. Because these devices are very expensive and un-
available to claimants through the FOIA, neither party should be permitted to use them during 
administrative proceedings. 
80. See Apollo v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137, 139 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (applying relation 
back theory to cure defective claim). 
8 •. See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d at 814 ("[C]ounsel's failure to document the 
personal injury part of the administrative claim precluded the agency from evaluating the 
entire claim for settlement purposes."); Haynes v. United States, No. 81 C 2341 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
2, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("Allowing a claimant to ignore a 
proper request for supporting materials and to then file a claim in federal court, would prohibit 
meaningful agency evaluation of the claim and would subvert the purposes of Section 
2675(a)."); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981) (available 
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) ("[T]he Government, at a minimum, is entitled to suffi-
cient information to enable it to evaluate the claim and choose between settlement and litiga-
tion."); Rothman v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (''their failure to 
furnish information on damages absolutely foreclosed the government from arriving at a rea-
sonable settlement figure"); see also notes 50-53 & 72-73 supra and accompanying text. 
82. See note 67 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 76 supra. 
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litigate their claims. 83 This approach provides the ager1cy with the 
same information it would obtain through discovery, but allows it to 
demand the documentation before suit so that prompt settlement ne-
gotiations can take place. 84 
A claimant will also be able to evaluate his claim.85 An injured 
party has two avenues for obtaining information from the govern-
ment. First, he can simply request the information from the agency. 
Second, should the agency prove uncooperative, the claimant can 
compel disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 86 
Although the scope of discovery under the FOIA is not as broad as 
that available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,87 discov-
ery opportunities are not so disparate that the government will enjoy 
a significant advantage over the plaintiff during presuit negotia-
83. See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text. 
84. This result is consistent with congressional intent to expedite settlements. See S. REP, 
No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Cooe CONG. & Ao. News at 2517 (FTCA 
amendments designed to help settle meritorious claims "more quickly"). 
85. Settlements rarely occur until each party knows the strengths and weaknesses of the 
other's case. See, e.g., H. BAER & A. BRODER,supra note 67, at 91 ("It is impossible to empha-
size strongly enough the role of disclosure in facilitating settlement. Free and open exchange 
of information generates mutual confidence, and this in tum creates the atmosphere out of 
which successful settlements are negotiated."); P. HERMANN, supra note 48, at 160 ("Probably 
the greatest roadblock in the way of advantageous settlement of personal injury claims is fail-
ure of the opposing sides to furnish information to each other. It is like trying to sell a product 
without disclosing much about it."). This observation applies to presuit administrative settle-
ment because a claimant is not likely to settle his case without knowing the viability of the 
government's defenses. See Jacoby, supra note 43, at 1215 ("The limited opportunities for [the 
claimant to conduct] discovery ... may diminish the frequency of administrative settlements 
. . . ."). Congress did not, however, consider the effect that one-way discovery would have on 
the settlement process. See id. at 1217 n.29 ("The brieflegislative history ... does not contain 
any discussion of the difficulties of discovery in the required administrative process."). For a 
discussion of the problem of one-way discovery and of possible solutions, see id. at 1215-17, 
This Note argues that claimants can use the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain 
information needed for settlement evaluation. See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text, 
86. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Sections 
552(a)(l) and 552(a)(2) require publication or disclosure of agency records, such as rules of 
procedure ((a)(l)(C)) and administrative staff manuals ((a)(2)(C)). Claimants most frequently 
seek disclosure of agency records through section 552(a)(3): 
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes 
such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, 
fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to 
any person. 
The FOIA is intended to allow private citizens broad access to records maintained by gov-
ernment agencies. See Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345,352 (1982); NLRB v. Robbins Tire 
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-24 (1978); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 
352, 361 (1976); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973). 
87. Nine categories of records have been excluded from the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 5'52(b) 
(1976). However, "these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, 
not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. 'These exemptions are explicitly made exclu-
sive' ... and must be narrowly construed." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 
361 (quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79); accord Chilivis v. 
SEC, 673 F.2d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 1982); Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F. 2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 
1980). 
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tions.88 Moreover, a claimant controls the ultimate weapon against a 
88. The FOIA exemption most likely to include records needed by claimants is 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(5) (Exemption 5), which excludes "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or 
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an JJ,gency in litigation with 
the agency . . . ." The Supreme Court has construed this section to "exempt those docu-
ments, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context." NLRB v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); accord Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Air-
craft Engr. Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975). Specifically, documents covered by Exemption 5 
include those that fall within "the attorney-client privilege, . . . the attorney work product 
privilege, . . . and the so-called executive, governmental or deliberative process privilege." 
Pies v. IRS, 668 F.2d 1350, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1981); accord Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Depart-
ment of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because the proposal set forth in this 
Note would limit an agency's ability to request privileged information, see note 70 supra and 
accompanying text, Exemption 5 would not place claimants at a disadvantage relative to the 
government. 
The most severe limit on the FOIA as a substitute discovery device is that it only applies to 
items "on which information is stored." B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, 2 ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW§ 9.07[2]; see, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 161-62 (FOIA does 
not compel agencies to write opinions or to create explanatory material); Yeager v. Drug En-
forcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982); DiVigio v. Kelley, 571 F.2d 538, 542 
(10th Cir. 1978). Though the information need not be transcribed into a document, see, e.g., 
Yeager, 678 F.2d at 321 ("computer-stored records ... are still 'records' for purposes of the 
FOIA"); Save the Dolphins v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407,411 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975) (movie film is a record), three dimensional items may not be reachable under the 
FOIA. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Kan. 1971) (A record is 
"[t]hat which is written or transcribed to perpetuate knowledge of act" and does not include 
items such as rifle and bullets used to assassinate President Kennedy.), qffd, 460 F.2d 671 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972); Note, The Freedom of Information Act-A Poten-
tial Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73, 99-101 (1976). 
But see Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Ieformation Act, 31 
STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1095-98 (1979). 
The proposal advanced by this Note requires claimants to answer questions posed by agen-
cies. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. Because the stored information limitation 
applies to agency records but not to materials possessed by claimants, the government argua-
bly has a better capacity to exercise discovery. This advantage is offset somewhat because, 
even as to privileged documents, the FOIA "extend[s] to the discovery of purely factual mate-
rial appearing in those documents in a form that is severable without compromising the pri-
vate remainder of the documents." Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 
(1973). Courts applying Mink's distinction between deliberative and factual information, 410 
U.S. at 90-92, have protected documents that reveal litigation theories or strategies, see, e.g., 
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 421 U.S. 132, 155 (1975), but have ordered production of 
those containing purely factual material. See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 
1131, 1138 (4th Cir. 1977) ("facts contained in witnesses' statements of other purely factual 
material"); Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 560 (D.D.C. 1981) (handwritten notes prepared 
by attorney for use in litigation). In contrast, Rule 26(b}(3) requires a showing of substantial 
need before documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" are discoverable. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Ultimately, the fact "[t]hat for one reason or another a docu-
ment may be exempt from discovery does not mean that it will be exempt from a demand 
under FOIA." Playboy Enters. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Because agency attorneys will not rely very heavily on their memories to store facts relevant to 
FTCA claims, claimants should be able to obtain considerable amounts of factual information 
through the FOIA. 
FOIA discovery may also impose time delays on claimants. See Levine, Using the Freedom 
of Information Act as a Discovery Device, ~6 Bus. LAW. 45, 46-47 (1980). Toran, Information 
Disclosure in Civil Action: The Freedom of Ieformation Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 868-69 (1981). Theoretically, an agency could postpone compliance 
to prevent disclosure of its case during administrative proceedings. However, the prospect of 
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recalcitrant agency - he can refuse to settle. 89 
In fact, a claimant may not need to resort to any sort of presuit 
discovery because Congress intended that administrative proceed-
ings would encourage prompt settlement of simpler claims.90 If the 
agency involved admits liability upon conclusion of its internal in-
vestigation, it will need documentation only to determine that the 
claimant is the proper party to raise the claim and that the damages 
sought are accurate.91 If the resulting award is satisfactory to the 
claimant, he will not need to obtain additional information pertinent 
to settlement evaluation. Thus, the proposal permits both the claim-
ant and the agency to obtain information needed to investigate set-
tlement options. 
One could criticize the approach advanced by this Note by argu-
ing that it will produce ancillary proceedings on two issues: whether 
the information requested was discoverable under the Federal 
Rules,92 and whether the plaintiff replied within a reasonable time. 
This objection is not without merit because extensive litigation over 
presuit settlement, together with an occasional resort to judicial prodding, should provide an 
incentive sufficient to expedite processing of FOIA requests. 
Finally, claimants seeking information under the FOIA would lose discovery leverage that 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) sometimes provides to parties who show "substantial need." See 
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 149 n.16 ("Exemption 5 was intended to permit 
disclosure of those intra-agency memoranda which would 'routinely be disclosed' in private 
. . . litigation and we accept this as the law." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong,, 2d 
Sess. 10 (1966)); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86 ("Nor does the 
Act, by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual seeking the infor-
mation, although such an inquiry would ordinarily be made of a private litigant."). Under this 
Note's approach, a claimant would not suffer from this loss of leverage because neither party 
could use a "substantial need" proceeding. See note 70 supra. 
Thus, although "(d]iscovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of 
the Act," Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974), claimants can 
use the FOIA to obtain information for settlement evaluation. See Bannercreft Clothing Co., 
415 U.S. at 30 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("That Act, contrary to what the Court says, had as one 
of its purposes 'discovery for litigation purposes.' "); Levine, supra, at 55; Toran, supra, at 859-
65. This Note's proposal, which provides both agencies and claimants with information 
needed to evaluate claims, should maximize the FTCA amendments' presuit settlement policy. 
89. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao. 
NEWS at 2520 ("If a satisfactory arrangement cannot be reached in the matter, the claimant 
can simply do as he does today - file suit."). 
90. Congress acknowledged that "some difficult tort claims . . • cannot be processed and 
evaluated in this 6-month period," S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2518, but envisioned that agencies would be able to settle sim-
ple, meritorious claims quickly. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
2517. 
91. Congress arguably anticipated that the administrative claim procedure would work in 
this manner. See S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Cool! CONG, & 
Ao. NEWS at 2517. 
92. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Since the claims presenta-
tion requirement is jurisdictional, if it were interpreted to require more than minimal notice, 
there would be, inevitably, hearings on ancillary matters of fact whenever the agency rejected 
a claim as incomplete."). 
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a standard that tolls the statute of limitation would undermine the 
rule by making it uncertain. 
The ancillary proceedings concern is not compelling for three 
reasons. First, communication between agency officials and claim-
ants during the administrative process will enable potential plaintiffs 
to clarify some ambiguous documentation requests,93 thus eliminat-
ing the need for judicial proceedings. Second, attorneys can avoid 
ancillary disputes about the propriety of particular documentation 
requests by examining cases that interpret the discovery provisions 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.94 Finally, the only alterna-
tive to the approach proposed by this Note is a documentation stan-
dard that rigidly de.fines the sort of information that an agency can 
request. But a bright line rule has other disadvantages. Sw!fl draws 
a line favoring presuit settlement but fails to promote the FTCA 
amendments' fairness policy;95 the Adams minim~l notice rule, on 
the other hand, favors fairness at the expense of settlement96 and 
produces no more certainty than this Note's approach because it re-
quires only that the notice be "sufficient to enable the agency to in-
93. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1982) (several 
letters from government to claimant); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(discussions between Navy and claimant's attorney); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 
447 (6th Cir. 1981) (fourteen letters between parties). 
94. This Note criticizes the Justice Department regulations, which currently give agencies 
the authority to request documentation, but it does not argue that agencies cannot make such 
requests in specific cases. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery 
of medical reports. See FED. R. Crv. P. 34(a); Fleming v. Gardner, 84 F.R.D. 217,218 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1978) (emergency room records concerning hospitalization and treatment); Flora v. 
Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576,580 (M.D. N.C. 1978) (records of psychiatric exam conducted some 
fifteen years earlier); Mattson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F.R.D. 523, 526 (N.D. Ohio 1967) 
(hospital and physicians' records). This right to discover medical records is not limited by Rule 
35, which governs physical and mental examinations. FED. R. C1v. P. 35(b)(3) (rule "does not 
preclude discovery of a report of an examining physician . . . in accordance with the provi-
sions of any other rule"); see, e.g., Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1965) (Rule 
35 is merely a method to avoid having to show cause to discover medical reports. It was not 
intended to be the exclusive method for medical report exchange.); Hughes v. Groves, 47 
F.R.D. 52, 57 (W.D. Mo. 1969) ("Relevant hospital records appear in any personal injury case 
to be subject to production for 'good cause shown.' . . . Rule 35, however, may not pre-empt 
production of reports under Rule 34 .... "); Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D. Md. 
1961) ("Rule 35 does not prevent a plaintiff or a defendant from obtaining an order under 
Rule 34 requiring the opposite party to produce and to permit the inspection and copying of 
medical reports and hospital records, unless such reports and records are privileged."); cf. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 460 F. Supp. 150, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (''This Court has been unable 
to locate a case which recognizes a federal common law physician-patient privilege."); Hardy 
v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (''There is no federally-created physician-
patient privilege."). This Note's approach would permit documentation requests seeking 
claimant medical records because such requests would be allowed under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. q: Avery v. United States Postal Serv., 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(medical reports); Tucker v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 956 (3d Cir. 1982) (item-
ized medical bills); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 1981) (medi-
cal reports). · 
95. See notes 62-71 supra and accompanying text 
96. See notes 47-57 supra and accompanying text 
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vestigate."97 The Justice Department could conceivably promote 
both policies with bright line regulations,98 but this option offers no 
guidance to courts defining the claim requirement under current reg-
ulations. Thus, courts must choose between a standard that offers a 
bright line test but fails to promote simultaneously the two policies 
underlying the FTCA and one that advances both policies but pro-
duces ancillary proceedings on the meaning of its terms. Because the 
prospect of additional proceedings will be minimized by resort to 
existing interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
by communications between claimants and agencies, the courts 
should adopt a standard that furthers both policies of the FTCA 
amendments. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfortunate that plaintiffs are often denied an opportunity to 
have the merits of their claims considered because of their failure to 
comply with documentation requests.99 Although Congress imposed 
an administrative claim requirement, it failed to define the term. 
97. 615 F.2d at 289; see Note, supra note 18, at 531. 
98. Consistent regulations with specific documentation requirements will promote both 
policies underlying the 1966 amendments. With only a few modifications, the present regula-
tions could be made acceptable. First, the requirements listed in section 14.4 should be consis-
tent with the list on the back of the Standard Form 95. See notes 18 & 68 supra and 
accompanying text; Appendix A. Because many claimants see only Standard Form 95, the 
affected agency should not jeopardize settlement prospects by making additional requests, For 
claimants who see both the regulations and Standard Form 95, complete consistency can only 
reduce confusion, again creating a better settlement environment. 
Second, sections 14.4(a)(8), (b)(6) and (c)(5) should be eliminated from the regulations. 
See notes 67 & 69 supra and accompanying text. These ambiguous sections are currently open 
to abuse. After handling thousands of tort cases, government agencies and the Attorney Gen-
eral must know which documents are needed to settle the vast majority of each type of claim. 
The settlement prospects of claims unusual enough to require special information should be 
sacrificed for the sake of clarity. This result is not unreasonable because Congress realized that 
some claims would be too complicated to settle in an administrative setting. See note 90 supra. 
Justice Department regulations that specifically identify the documentation required of claim-
ants would preclude agency demands for nondiscoverable information. See notes 69-70 supra 
and accompanying text. As the body of case law involving challenges to specific requirements 
grows, the number of ancillary proceedings to determine the propriety of agency demands will 
decrease. If the Justice Department eliminates these regulations and harmonizes Standard 
Form 95 with section 14.4, it would eliminate the need for a relation back doctrine. See note 
80 supra and accompanying text. Standard Form 95 and the regulations would then provide 
claimants with notice of exactly what information would be required to toll the statute of 
limitations. 
Finally, the new regulation should clearly state that a claimant must submit the informa-
tion required by section 14.4 and by Standard Form 95 within the statutory period in order to 
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 2675(a). Section 14.2(a) should state that the 
claim must consist of an executed Standard Form 95 and the documentation it requires, or any 
other writing that provides the same information and documentation. This approach would 
eliminate the confusion created by the word "notification." See note 68 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
99. Many of these cases admittedly evoke sympathy for the claimant. See, e.g., Adams v. 
United States, 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1980) (brain damaged child); Rothman v. United States, 
434 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (wrongful death of son). 
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Relying on the legislative history, the Adams and Sw!ft courts have 
attempted to explain the claim requirement, but each failed to bal-
ance the competing policies that caused Congress to enact the ad-
ministrative claim provision. The Department of Justice could 
remedy the situation by introducing new regulations, 100 but it has 
failed to act. 
This Note offers a solution that, unlike the approaches adopted 
in Adams and Sw!ft, promotes both the settlement and fairness poli-
cies of the FTCA amendments: toll the statute of limitations upon 
the filing of the Standard Form 95 or its equivalent, but make plain-
tiffs comply with all unambiguous documentation requests that sat-
isfy the discovery standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The proposal will admittedly engender ancillary proceedings, but 
their number will be minimized by claimant communication with 
affected agencies and by existing precedent. Thus, while the pro-
posed solution may not be entirely satisfactory, it represents the best 
available alternative. 
100. See note 98 supra. 
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APPENDIX A 
STANDARD FORM 95-FRONT 
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, in'9rlh:IM.IO't ,,n I~ r.:vcr.c 'lltfc isrJ 'WPf'IY 1n(u1m.1h,1n rcq-uc .. tcd ,,n h11h 1 ••~"llll.'t"TIU'<S: r1t1"re In. Ink ut l~-•f)ct Plmc re•~ ,.udully 11,,, 




I SUB.'-'11 TO: 2. NM\E AND ADDRESS OF CLAIMANT (Nmnhtr. Jlrttl, t llr, Slillr', 
111td /.ip ("r,i/t'J 
3 1YPE OF EMPLOYMENT ,. AGE S. MAAITAl 6. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SPOUSE, If ANY (N11mhl'r, Jlft'rt, f II••• ,\llllt', c111J 
STATUS ZipC,HirJ . 
I I MnllARY 
CIVIUAN 
r, PlACE OF ACCIDENT (Cifrc- c-ity ,,r 1111,11 cmd Sflltt': if mllsidt di! limiu, l11dirnt1• B. DATE ANO DAV 9. IIUE 
milr,1,:,• ,,, JiJlllnl"t' ,,. ffe'dTC'JI ,;,_., ,,, 1111,·,11 OF ACCIDENI t,IM OH P.MI 
ro AMOUNJ Of ClAIM (i,1 ,/11tl,1n1 
A P•OmlY OAMA<'I • r· PIOSONAl ONJURY ·1 C WOONCIVI l>lAfH ID 10fAl 
11. DESClllPIION Of ACCIDENT flfcttr bl'l,m. 111 Jc-11111. 11ll l.11,m11fm 1, cmJ c·i1111m11,w, 1, 1111.-ui/111,: lllf' J,u,w,:t'. l11jt11't, ,,, J,·11111, IJttlll/.rinll 
,,, n,111.1 ,mJ 11r11p,•r1_,· i,u-.,t,·rc/ unJ 1l1t 1·mut' thr:u,,J) • 
12 Pl!OPERIV DAMAGE 
NAMl ANO Al>DAISS 01 0..-.,NIR. IF OlK(R tHAN ClAW.ANt tNt,mhc-1. ,11t·rt,ckr0St"tl'0mrJ/1p(",,J,-J 
8Rlfl1Y DfSCA:8[ ltl'IIO AND lOCAtJON OF PAOPfRJY AND NAt~R( AND fXUNI OF DMAGE u,,. ;,.,,,m ti.m, "'' ,,.,,.,,,. siJI' fir, tnl'lllf,J 1,f 111'1'11mlldll11111/11tll1J 
11. PCRSONAL INJURY 
SJA1( NA1UA£ ANO (XUNI OF INJURY WHICH FOllMS IH( tlASIS Of lHIS CLAIM 
,. WllNESSES 
-·-- NAM( AOORIS,S IN1m1/wr, 1/11'1'1, "''"• .ft1III', mt.I /,p ('1.J.-1 
-· 
----
I tlRllfY THA1 THE AMOUNl OF CLAIM COVERS ONlY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAU$£0 DY 111£ ACCIO(Nf A80V( ANO AGRU 10 ACClPt SAID 
A.~OUNT IN FUll SAllSFACTION ANO flNAl SEITUMENf Of lHIS CLAIM 
_, SIGNATURE OF CIAIIMNT I/Iii, .•ixm11111,· ,,,,,,,,.,,,,. ,,.,., ;,, 111/ ,,,,,,,.. ,,.,,..,, .. .,,.,,.,,,,, 116. DAIE Of ClA"~ 
<"l\'11 Pl'NAl:1 Y H>R l'RESl'N nNc; CRIMINAi. l'LNAI. rY I OR PIIF.!>HNl INCl FIIAUl>UI ENT 
l·RAl!llULl'Nf Cl.AIM Cl.AIM OR MAKINO FAl.,~H HATl'MloNTS 
I he- d.1im.1nl ,h;sll forfeit :1nJ pa)" Ill lh(' United Stal~, lhc ,um Fine ur nnl roo1c lhJn S IO,CHM) ur lmrrhunmcnl r11r nul more 
,,r ~:.uoo. (!Ill'\ J,111\llc 1hi: .1mou11t .,r J.un:,gc, ,u,1aint:J li)' lhc lh.,n $ Y<Jr. ur l>ulh. IJ,r ~1 S1111. bV,~. NV, IN U.\ C'.181, 100/.1 
l"m1i."ll ';1.11c'- f.'fr1· RS. §.l.J'JIJ • .f4JN: JI U.S C. !JI.I 
..... 
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APPENDIX A 
STANDARD FORM 95-REVERSE 
./ 
PRIVACY ACT NOTICE 
This Notiu b provid:d in ~-cord&ncc with lhe Privacy Act. S U.S C. B. Pri11tlpi,l ru,JttW: The information reqUtUcd it to be u,ed in eva!u.alin& 
5Sb{t)l'l), and conccnu the i.::irormadoo rrquntcd in 1hc lctkf to which 1hm clalm• 
Nut~ Is auachcd. C. Routbi, (fu-. °" ~ ltic: Notkcs of Systems of Records ror the aacncy lo 
A. ~:~wi~ rn~~lz~is~tc~ ~:~1~ ~~U.J~ 2~1°:,":': r: whom )'llU .... ,•1't1"1iUinJ lhis ronn for Ibis iDfOrm&ltOA. D. Flfttt oJ Fa,'• rt',~ RrT;,,,nd: Dl,closurc is voluntary. However. (adure lo 
Cl'R.14.l. 
!if!Y-:!:!,.t!-'·intcJ inrormalion or 10 cs.ccuu the Conn may render your 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Complote all ltom1-ln1ort the word NONE where appllcablo 
C1tims ro, d&mJ.&c to or ror !ow. or dntructlOa or property, or for pc:rl<lftaJ 
~~ic~rr:'1ep.J~~.aj,.:! !f:i~!n~:O~l::J:~>'.:i= .~ :.:, ~"~ lnJU'J, m11SI bit si&,ned by 1hc ownu or the rrorc-r11 damaged or Ion or 1hc 
=~:.~:;,.n:;-.:; ~~=!~l f~1~~1:,d:~:~r~!1'~!n~~ r~ffiii'~ sblc:menb or cs1ima1cs by rc:h11b1c:, dWntcr«icd concerns. o,. ,r pay~nl hu bttn i:iwfe. lhc llcmizC'd siglltd rC\."ClpU evidencing pa)'mtnl. 
I~ claim ~r be- fikd by• duly au1honzcd a1,n1 ,,r otMr IC',:al IC'J'l~l:ztivr. (d 1a suprort or cJa1ms for damagr to propcny \1/hkb is Dot ecunomintly 
11,nvickJ CVldCftC'C t.1lisfacl1>ry In 1hc- Gn,c-1nmail is MJbtniUC'd with sa~ cbi:Q r1:par•b!c, or 1f the property 1s lost or dcs110ycd0 lhc cWmfflt s.hould submit 
nubh,hin& authoti1y to act. statrmenls as 10 lhe original cost or the propmy. lhc: 1U1e or purctwc-. and lhe 
c~{~~~~tl~ •~i:,.:~: ~ori::h ro':r~ni~~ ~~%1::,~ value oflhc rropt,ty, botb before ar.d after the accidtuL Such stat.:mmu lhould be by disin1crC'Skd competent pusons. preferably reputable ffl?crs or orriciah 
J'C~Zt ~~T~WnuJc :t:,iafJ'~1~mpctcnt evidence as ramilw with the l)'pt: of {)tOpcrty dam.aged, or by IWO Of CIOl'e competitive bidden. and lhould be ccrt1licd u bein~ jusl and corm:t. 
(,il:~}~ supJ10rl vf cWm ror rmonaJ injury or Jealh. lhc cl~manl sh.:ultJ 1ubmit Any ful1htt i1mNCtions or inronnat1on riccc:ssuy in the prcpuahoa or your daim 'Nill be furnished. upon rcquol. by the omec indicated in item #I on the 
a "'nllirn rcpon by 1he ancnding rhy«ian. shawina 1hc nalurc and c&tent or reverse Ude. 
1nJury. 1b(o ru1urc anJ c11en1 or 1re~1n~at. 1b(o Jqrcc ar pcrmanenl duabtli1y. 1r {d) F~urc 10 compk1dy cucu1c Ibis form or lo supply 1he requested ma1ffll1 
an), I~ proanmk. and d-.c pcr4.J u(hMr4:1ah11non. or incaraciution. ~nacluna, wilhin two years rrom the dale lhe aUeaaiions accrued m,y render your clwn 
unmraJ bills for maJK"aJ, ho)pital. or burial e1pcm.('S QctuaUy inc1:rrcd. ""anva1id'". 
INSURANCE COVERAGE 
-- .. ----------·--··----·--· -·-----
In 111J"·1 1h.11 ,uhn1i:-11iun 1-.l.1inh m.1) he .l\ljuJi1:.11c,I. ii" 1.·,,cn1i.1I lh:111hc cl.aim.ml i,r,1\·i1lc lhc follm\ing inrurmJtion n:l!,,1rJin,; th-: in,ur-Jnce 
1.11\i:r.1~«: 11( 111, ,chide ,,r (11\l!"rly. 
17 00 YOU CARlcY ACCIO(Nt INSURAUC£? l I YlS, If YlS. CIVf NM\t ANO ADDRESS Of INSURANCE COMPANY IN11111bu. Jtrr1·1. cil\,!il1llr. u11J 
/111 (",,,/1•J AND POLICY NUMBER [I NO 
18 HAVl YOU lll(O CIAlt.\ ON YOUR INSURANCE CARRIER IN THIS INSTANCE. AND If SO. IS IT 19 If OEDUC11BL£. SJAT£ Al,\OUNf 
IUll COVERAGE OR DlOUCIIBlE? 
,o IF CLAIM HAS BUN FIUO Wl1H YOUR CARRIER. \.'/HAT ACTION HAS YOUR INSURER TAKEN OR PROPOSES TO TAKE WHH RlFERENCE TO YOUR 
CIAIM,? I/I 11 11,·1.-,u,r,- 1lt11I ,-,,1111u1•1111i,111,,·,,· f,111,1 
21 DO "rOU CARRY PUBUC UABllltY AND PROP£R1Y DAMAGE INSURANCE? 0 YES. IF YES, GIVE NAME ANO ADDRESS OF INSURANCE CAR-
RlfR 1.\'111111•1·1. ,11,•,·1. till· • • \lcltr. ,mJ 711• C,,,l,•J ONO 
*Gl'0,1071 0-2~1511 
